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ABSTRACT Unlike aerial base station enabled by a single unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), aerial coordi-
nated multiple points (CoMP) can be enabled by a UAV swarm. In this case, the management of multiple
UAVs is important. This paper considers the power allocation strategy for a UAV swarm-enabled aerial
network to enhance the physical layer security of the downlink transmission, where an eavesdropper moves
following the trajectory of the swarm for better eavesdropping. Unlike existing works, we use only the
large-scale channel state information (CSI) and maximize the secrecy throughput in a whole-trajectory-
oriented manner. The overall transmission energy constraint on each UAV and the total transmission duration
for all the legitimate users are considered. The non-convexity of the formulated problem is solved by using
max-min optimization with iteration. Both the transmission power of desired signals and artificial noise (AN)
are derived iteratively. Simulation results are presented to validate the effectiveness of our proposed power
allocation algorithm and to show the advantage of aerial CoMP by using only the large-scale CSI.
INDEX TERMS Artificial noise, large-scale fading, physical layer security, secrecy throughput, UAV swarm.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have
attracted great interest in wireless communications [1]–[4].
Due to their mobility and elevated position, they can provide
agile communications [5]. With their high maneuverability,
UAV can augment the network capacity and coverage, espe-
cially in the extreme environments without infrastructure,
such as disaster rescue, traffic monitoring and so on [1], [6].
More specifically, UAVs are usually cost-effective [7]–[10].
They can be exploited to assist on-demand missions, such
as high-speed data transmission in the fifth generation (5G)
wireless networks. In addition, with the huge demand in
emergency applications, i.e., public safety, delivery and
surveillance, deploying a flock of UAVs, or swarm, is becom-
ingmore attractive, which plays a vital role in meeting perfor-
mance requirements for communications between multiple
UAVs and 5G [11]–[15].
The associate editor coordinating the review of this article and approving
it for publication was Zhen Li.
One of the serious concerns in UAV swarm-enabled aerial
networks is how to guarantee the privacy and secrecy of the
system. Due to the broadcast nature and inherent randomness
of wireless channels, UAV swarm-enabled communication
networks are particularly vulnerable to various security
threats, such as information eavesdropping, information leak-
age, data modification and so on. In addition, to facilitate
the secure transmission, the UAV swarm often places itself
near the legitimate users, which is beneficial to eavesdrop-
ping, especially when the eavesdropper moves close to the
legitimate users.
A. RELATED WORK
To achieve perfect security, the conventional encryption
schemes are typically implemented at the upper layer using
cryptographic methods. However, this is often achieved at the
cost of high computational complexity [16].
Unlike the traditional cryptographic methods, physical
layer security (PLS), using the information-theoretic and
VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 120901
X. Wang et al.: UAV Swarm-Enabled Aerial CoMP: A Physical Layer Security Perspective
signal processing approaches, has been widely investigated in
the UAV-enabled wireless networks [17]–[20]. They enhance
the coverage and security of the wireless systems by exploit-
ing physical characteristics of the wireless channel. Specifi-
cally, by adaptively adjusting the UAVs’ location, they could
overcome the propagation constraints in the cellular systems,
and provide new possibilities or opportunities for security
enhancement. The authors in [17] utilized UAV as a mobile
relay, and maximized the secrecy rate of the system with
transmit optimization in a four-node. In [18], the authors
investigated UAV-enabled secure communication systems
where a mobile UAV sent confidential messages to multiple
ground users. By considering the imperfect information on
the locations of the eavesdroppers, the authors in [19] inves-
tigated a UAV-ground communication system with multiple
potential eavesdroppers on the ground. The authors in [20]
considered UAV-assisted secure communications between a
legitimate transmitter-receiver pair for unknown eavesdrop-
per location by taking UAV as an air-to-ground friendly
jammer.
These studies [17]–[20] have provided insightful results
for improving the secrecy performance of the UAV-aided
wireless communications. However, they assume an ideal
free-space path-loss model [17]–[19] between the UAV and
the legitimate receivers/eavesdroppers or the instantaneous
channel state information (CSI) [20] of the eavesdroppers at
the transmitter, which may not be practical.
In practice, it is generally difficult to acquire the instan-
taneous CSI of the eavesdroppers, especially when they are
passive. To deal with that, an effective approach, named as
artificial noise(AN), has been proposed to mask the desired
signals for enhancing the secrecy performance [21]–[25],
where AN is designed based on the instantaneous CSI of
the legitimate receiver and transmitted in the null-space
of the legitimate channel. Although this scheme is help-
ful for the security, it requires perfect instantaneous CSI
between the source and the legitimate receiver at the trans-
mitter, which is nearly unworkable. The idea is then gener-
alized to the UAV-enabled wireless systems, where a UAV
is applied as a mobile jammer to transmit AN [26] or a
legitimate receiver [27]. However, theseworks haven’t shown
useful guidelines to improve physical layer security of UAV
swarm-enabled aerial networks.
B. MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS
Despite of the above fruitful results, some challenges still
remain in the UAV swarm-enabled aerial networks.
For the UAV swarm-enabled aerial networks, an open
challenge is how to acquire CSI. To practically depict the
typical propagation environments, the composite channel
model, consisting of both small-scale and large-scale fad-
ing, needs to be used, which is in stark contrast to the
existing literatures [17]–[19]. Under the composite channel,
one key role for the power allocation strategy is the prior
knowledge. Since it is impossible to perfectly acquire the
random small-scale fading prior to the whole trajectory of
the UAV swarm, it is almost infeasible to assume perfect
CSI. In this paper, we devote to guarantee the secrecy per-
formance of the system in a whole-trajectory-oriented man-
ner by utilizing only the large-scale CSI of the legitimate
receivers/eavesdroppers, which can be achieved at much
lower cost.
In wireless communication systems, path loss could sig-
nificantly reduce the signal reception quality at the legit-
imate users, especially in the UAV swarm-enabled aerial
networks. In the existing literatures, one effective scheme
to overcome the limitation is by means of multiple antenna
systems, i.e., multiple-input single-output (MISO) [28], [29],
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) [30], [31], or single-
input multiple-output (SIMO) [32]. However, due to the lim-
ited size, it is hard for UAVs to be equipped with multiple
antennas. To handle that, we consider an effective coordi-
nated multiple points (CoMP) between UAVs in this paper,
where multiple single-antenna UAVs are combined to form
the UAV swarm and then act as a virtual multiple-antenna
node. Unlike the conventional CoMP with fixed base sta-
tions (BSs), the UAV swarm is able to cooperatively operate
as an aerial CoMP by utilizing the mobility of the UAVs.
Note that, in contrast to the existing works achieving CoMP
based on perfect CSI [33], [34], our scheme uses only the
predictable large-scale CSI between UAVs and the legitimate
receivers/eavesdroppers.
The transmission energy constraint at each UAV is
another challenge for the secrecy performance of UAV
swarm-enabled aerial networks. Since it’s generally difficult
to recharge the battery of the UAV during its flight, not only
the transmission power budget but also the total transmis-
sion energy constraint should be taken into account for each
UAV. Note that the total energy consumption of the UAV
consists of two components: the UAV’s transmission energy
consumption, which is due to the radiation, signal processing
as well as other circuitry, and the UAV’s propulsion energy
consumption, which is determined by the UAV’s flying status
including the velocity and acceleration [7]. Due to the signal
processing of the confidential messages and the circuitry, this
work mainly focuses on the transmission energy constraint
per UAV.
In addition, the transmission duration used to serve the
legitimate users also plays a vital role to improve the secrecy
performance of the system. Due to the limited total transmis-
sion energy at each UAV, the transmission duration may be
restricted, which should be well designed for each legitimate
user.
Motivated by the above observations, we investigate the
AN-aided secure transmission for the UAV swarm-enabled
aerial CoMP, where both of the legitimate receivers and
eavesdroppers are equipped with multiple antennas. Differ-
ent from the conventional eavesdropping, we assume the
eavesdropper randomly walks following the trajectory of the
UAV swarm, which may significantly deteriorate the secrecy
performance of the system. In addition, unlike the existing
AN-aided secure transmission based on the instantaneous
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CSI of the legitimate users, AN in our proposed scheme is
designed by using only the large-scale CSI. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first time that studies AN-assisted
secure transmission in the UAV swarm-enabled aerial CoMP
by exploiting only the large-scale CSI of the legitimate
receivers/eavesdroppers.
Our main contributions of the paper are summarized as
follows:
• We consider physical layer security in the UAV
swarm-enabled aerial networks. Specifically, multiple
single-antenna rotary-wing UAVs perform an aerial
CoMP, and enable a virtual MIMO transmission link
with the multiple-antenna legitimate receivers or the
eavesdropper, in which the swarm transmits the confi-
dential messages in conjunction with AN and sequen-
tially hovers to serve the scheduled legitimate users.
Unlike the existing wiretap mode where the eaves-
dropper keeps static at a fixed location, we con-
sider the eavesdropper moves following the trajectory
of the swarm for better eavesdropping in a passive
manner.
• To characterize the typical propagation environments,
we consider a practical composite channel model con-
sisting of both small-scale and large-scale fading. How-
ever, it is infeasible to achieve perfect CSI since
the small-scale channel fading is time-varying and
hard to be acquired. In this work, we use only the
large-scale channel fading, which is more reasonable
because the large-scale channel fading mainly depends
on the position information of both the UAV and
the legitimate receivers/eavesdroppers. We can obtain
such information based on the historical data and the
related distance between the UAV and the legitimate
receivers/eavesdroppers.
• Based on the large-scale CSI, an optimization frame-
work in a whole-trajectory-oriented manner is proposed
to maximize the secrecy throughput by jointly opti-
mizing the power allocation between the confidential
messages and AN as well as the transmission durations
of all the legitimate receivers subject to the overall trans-
mission energy constraint at each rotary-wing UAV. The
formulated problem is not convex and hard to be solved
directly. To deal with that, an equivalent max-min prob-
lem is reformulated by adopting the random matrix the-
ory, and then an efficient iterative algorithm is proposed.
Specifically, the problem is split into four subproblems.
For the first two and the fourth subproblems, they are
convex and can be solved using the general optimization
toolbox. For the third subproblem, we first transform its
non-convex behavior into the convex one by adopting a
successive convex approximation technique. Then, these
four subproblems are alternately updated in each itera-
tion. Furthermore, we show that the proposed algorithm
guarantees the convergence. Finally, simulation results
validate that our proposed scheme could achieve a good
secrecy performance.
C. ORGANIZATION AND NOTATIONS
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the system model and problem formulation.
Section III proposes power allocation for secure aerial CoMP.
In Section IV, simulation results and discussions are pre-
sented. Finally, conclusions are made in Section VI.
Throughout this paper, upper case and lower case boldface
letters represent the matrices and the vectors, respectively.
IL is an L × L identity matrix, and 0 is a zero vector. E(·)
denotes the expectation operation. (·)H and Tr(·) represent the
conjugate transpose and the trace of a matrix, respectively.
A  0 denotes that A is a positive semidefinite matrix. y ∼
N (0, a) denotes the Gaussian random variable with mean
0 and variance a. x ∼ CN (s, 6) is the complex circularly
symmetric Gaussian distribution with the mean vector s and
the covariance matrix 6.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the downlink transmission in the UAV
swarm-enabled aerial networks. As illustrated in Fig. 1,
the system consists of L rotary-wing UAVs (indexed with
1, . . . ,L),N legitimate users (indexedwith 1, . . . ,N ) as Bob,
and one eavesdropper as Eve. All the legitimate users and
the eavesdropper are equipped with NB and NE antennas,
respectively. For the rotary-wing UAVs, they form a UAV
swarm via CoMP, and act as an aerial base station to assist
the wireless networks. When the UAVs serve the legitimate
users, they are randomly dispatched in a circle centering at
the legitimate users with an altitude.
Due to the limited weight and size, only one single antenna
is equipped at each UAV. Over the flight of the UAV swarm,
the legitimate users could be provided with the confidential
messages when being scheduled.1 Due to the openness of
the wireless link, there exists a leakage of the confidential
messages. In this system, we assume the eavesdropper is pas-
sive and only intends for the confidential messages which are
transmitted to the scheduled legitimate users. Furthermore,
the eavesdropper randomly moves following the specific tra-
jectory of the swarm to improve eavesdropping. Meanwhile,
the eavesdropper also tries to keep a safety distance re away
from the scheduled legitimate users so that it could not be
spotted.
In this work, we assume the same consecutive period,
denoting as TU , for each rotary-wing UAV in the swarm,
which mainly consists of two parts: the total flying duration
Tf and the total transmission duration Tt . Tf is highly depen-
dent on the velocity of the UAVs, and Tt is determined by
the transmission energy consumption of the UAVs. In this
work, the UAVs are assumed to serve the scheduled legitimate
receivers in a sequential manner. Specifically, they hover
above a scheduled legitimate receiver to send the confidential
messages during a transmission duration, and then fly to
1In fact, the user scheduling issue is important for the system. However,
it is out of the scope of this work.
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FIGURE 1. Illustration of a UAV swarm-enabled aerial network, where a UAV swarm, acting as an aerial CoMP, enables MIMO secure communications
with the multiple-antenna legitimate users and the eavesdropper in a whole-trajectory-oriented manner. Specifically, the swarm hovers to serve the
scheduled legitimate user in the transmission duration, and then it flies to the next scheduled one within a flying duration. For the eavesdropper,
it wiretaps the confidential messages by moving following the trajectory of the UAV swarm.
the next scheduled one within a flying duration. In addition,
each legitimate receiver is assumed to be scheduled at most
once during the total transmission duration. Denote the trans-
mission durations for the scheduled legitimate users as τ1,
τ2, . . . , τN , respectively, which change in practice and need
to satisfy
N∑
n=1
τn ≤ Tt , (1)
0 ≤ τn ≤ τmax, ∀n, (2)
where τmax denotes the transmission duration budget. Note
that the transmission duration for each scheduled legitimate
user is normally short due to the limited transmission energy
of the rotary-wing UAV [35].
Suppose that the coordinate of the lth UAV in the nth trans-
mission duration is (wl[n], sl[n], hl[n]),2 where (wl[n], sl[n])
and hl[n] denote the horizontal coordinate and the alti-
tude of the lth UAV, respectively. Denote the coordinate of
the scheduled legitimate user/eavesdropper in the nth trans-
mission duration as (rq[n], tq[n], 0), where q ∈ {B,E}.
2The UAVs fly following a specific trajectory, whose locations can be
achieved by using the existing positioning technology, i.e., the technology
of Global Positioning System (GPS) and BeiDou Navigation Satellite Sys-
tem (BDS) combined positioning [36]. Based on the open channel link,
the UAVs can broadcast their locations to legitimate receivers for them to
follow.
Thus, the distance between the lth UAV and q at the nth
transmission duration is
dq,l[n]
=
√
(hl[n])2+
(
wl[n]−rq[n]
)2+(sl[n]−tq[n])2, q∈{B,E}.
(3)
To be practical, we consider both line-of-sight (LoS) and
non-line-of-sight (NLoS) connections between the UAVs and
the legitimate users. Therefore, the large-scale path loss
between the lth UAV and q at the nth transmission duration
can be modeled as [37]
PLdBq,l[n] =
A
1+ ae−b(ρq,l [n]−a) + Bq,l[n], (4)
where
A = ηLoS − ηNLoS,
Bq,l[n] = 20lg(dq,l[n])+ 20lg(4pi fc )+ ηNLoS,
ρq,l[n] = 180
pi
arcsin
(
hl[n]
dq,l[n]
)
,
ηLoS, ηNLoS, a and b are constants related to the propagation
environment, f is the carrier frequency, and c is the speed of
light [37].
Consequently, the absolute power loss between the lth
UAV and q at the nth transmission duration can be expressed
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as:
Qq,l[n] = 10
PLdBq,l [n]
10 . (5)
The channel from the lth UAV to q at the nth transmission
duration can be rewritten as
hq,l[n] = Q−
1
2
q,l [n]sq,l[n], (6)
where sq,l[n] ∈ CNq×1 represents the small-scale fad-
ing between the lth UAV and q, of which the entries are
independently and identically distributed (i.i.d) according to
CN (0, 1).
In order to degrade the eavesdropper’s channel, each UAV
transmits the confidential message in conjunction with AN.
Denoting xl[n] as the transmission signal from the lth UAV to
the scheduled legitimate user at the nth transmission duration,
we have
xl[n] = xsl [n]+ xal [n], (7)
where xsl [n] and x
a
l [n] represent the confidential message and
AN from the lth UAV, respectively.
Furthermore, we express the transmission power from the
lth UAV to the scheduled legitimate user at the nth transmis-
sion duration as
E{|xl[n]|2} = psl [n]+ pal [n], (8)
where E{|xsl [n]|2} = psl [n], E{|xal [n]|2} = pal [n], psl [n] and
pal [n] denote the power of the confidential message and that
of the artificial noise transmitted by the lth UAV for the
scheduled legitimate user at the nth transmission duration,
respectively.
Since each UAV has the limited transmission power,
we have
0 ≤ psl [n]+ pal [n] ≤ Pmax, ∀l, n (9)
where (9) represents the transmission power constraint and
Pmax is the transmission power budget of each UAV. Consid-
ering the short transmission duration, the transmission power
is assumed to keep constant at the nth transmission duration.
Considering the transmission energy limitation of the
UAVs within the flying period, the following constraint is
achieved
N∑
n=1
(psl [n]+ pal [n])τn ≤ Emax, ∀l (10)
where (10) denotes the total transmission energy constraint at
each UAV over the whole flight, and Emax is the transmission
energy budget per UAV.
Based on the aforementioned analysis, all the UAVs work
together to transmit the confidential messages for the legiti-
mate users, which could form a virtualNq×LMIMOcommu-
nication link. Note that to avoid the collision, we assume the
UAVs are restricted to fly following their specific trajectory
with a minimum safety distance between them. In this case,
the composite channel matrix Hq[n] ∈ CNq×L between the
swarm and q at the nth transmission duration can be expressed
as
Hq[n] = Sq[n]Qq[n], q ∈ {B,E} (11)
where
Hq[n] =
[
hq,1[n],hq,2[n], . . . ,hq,L[n]
]
,
Sq[n] =
[
sq,1[n], sq,2[n], . . . , sq,L[n]
]
,
Qq[n] =

Q
− 12
q,1 [n]
. . .
Q
− 12
q,L [n]
 .
The received signal at the scheduled legitimate user, denot-
ing yB[n], in the nth transmission duration, and that at the
corresponding eavesdropper, denoting yE [n], in the nth trans-
mission duration are given by
yB[n] = HB[n]
(
xs[n]+ xa[n]
)+ nB[n], (12)
yE [n] = HE [n]
(
xs[n]+ xa[n]
)+ nE [n], (13)
respectively, where xs[n] ∼ CN (0,Ps[n]) and xa[n] ∼
CN (0,Pa[n]) denote the confidential messages andAN trans-
mitted by the UAV swarm at the nth transmission dura-
tion,3 respectively, and Ps[n] and Pa[n] are their covariance
matrices, respectively. nB[n] ∼ CN (0, δ2INB ) and nE [n] ∼
CN (0, δ2INE ) denote the noise vectors at the scheduled legit-
imate user and the eavesdropper at the nth transmission dura-
tion, respectively, and δ2 represents the noise variance.4
Remark 1: Note that the locations of the legitimate
users/eavesdropper are prior known by the UAV swarm for
transmission resource allocation. Specifically, the positions
of the legitimate receivers in different transmission durations
could be detected by using GPS or Light Detection and
Ranging (LiDAR) at the UAVs [40].
Considering the eavesdropper’s passive behavior when it
randomly follows the specific trajectory of the UAV swarm,
it may be difficult to achieve the accurate positions of
the eavesdropper at the UAVs. In this work, we consider
a worst case scenario, where the power allocation strat-
egy is performed on the assumption that the eavesdropper
locates at the optimal position with the strongest receiving
power in a circle of radius re. Fig. 2 illustrates the optimal
location of the eavesdropper during the nth transmission
duration. Specifically, for the point in the located circle of
the eavesdropper with the central angle θ [n], the receiv-
ing power from the lth UAV is
psl [n]+pal [n]
Q¯E,l [n]
‖sE,l[n]‖2, where
3Different from the existing literatures [38], [39], AN in this work is
designed by using only the large-scale CSI instead of the instantaneous
legitimate CSI. Owing to the broadcast nature of the wireless channel,
AN unavoidably has a leakage and harms the legitimate receivers. Thus, it’s
important to carefully design the power allocation between the confidential
messages and AN so as to minimize the harmful effect on the legitimate users
while jamming the eavesdropper, which would be presented in details in the
following.
4Here, we assume the noise variance is the same, i.e., equal to δ2, over the
flying period. For convenience, we drop n here.
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FIGURE 2. Illustration of the eavesdropper’s optimal location in the
located circle of the eavesdropper with the safety distance during
the nth transmission duration (top view of Fig. 1).
Q¯E,l[n] = QE,l[n]
∣∣
rE [n]=rB[n]+re cos(θ [n]),tE [n]=tB[n]+re sin(θ [n])
based on (5). Considering the constant transmission power
in the nth transmission duration, the optimal central angle
can be expressed as θ˜ [n] = arg min
θ [n]∈[0,2pi ]
Q¯E,1[n]+...+Q¯E,L [n]
L .
Then, the eavesdropper’s optimal location is obtained
as (rE [n], tE [n], 0) = (rB[n] + re cos(θ˜ [n]), tB[n] +
re sin(θ˜ [n]), 0).
B. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this subsection, we focus on the problem formulation for
this system. Based on (12), the achievable ergodic rate for the
scheduled legitimate user at the nth transmission duration is
given by
RB[n] = ESB[n]
[
log2 det
(
INB +HB[n]Ps[n](HB[n])H
×
(
HB[n]Pa[n](HB[n])H + δ2INB
)−1)]
, (14)
where ESB[n](·) is taken over the random small-scale fading
realization of SB[n],
Ps[n] =
p
s
1[n]
. . .
psL[n]
 , (15)
and
Pa[n] =
p
a
1[n]
. . .
paL[n]
 . (16)
Based on (13), the achievable ergodic rate for the eaves-
dropper who is intended for the confidential message of the
scheduled legitimate user at the nth transmission duration is
RE [n] = ESE [n]
[
log2 det
(
INE +HE [n]Ps[n](HE [n])H
×
(
HE [n]Pa[n](HE [n])H + δ2INE
)−1)]
, (17)
where ESE [n](·) is taken over the random small-scale fading
realization of SE [n].
Denote 4 = {τn,∀n}, 8s = {Ps[n],∀n} and 8a =
{Pa[n],∀n}. Then, the secrecy throughput for the UAV
swarm-enabled aerial networks is defined as [41]
R
(
4,8s,8a
) = 1
TU
N∑
n=1
τn
[
RB[n]− RE [n]
]+
, (18)
where [x]+ = max(0, x).
In this work, our goal is to maximize the secrecy through-
put over the flying period of the UAV swarm by jointly
optimizing the power of the confidential messages (i.e., 8s)
and AN power (i.e.,8a) as well as the transmission durations
of the legitimate users (i.e.,4) under the constraint of the total
transmission energy for each UAV. The optimization problem
can be formulated as
max
4,8s,8a
1
TU
N∑
n=1
τn
[
RB[n]− RE [n]
]+
(19a)
s.t. 0 ≤ psl [n]+ pal [n] ≤ Pmax, ∀l, n (19b)
N∑
n=1
(psl [n]+ pal [n])τn ≤ Emax, ∀l (19c)
N∑
n=1
τn ≤ Tt , (19d)
0 ≤ τn ≤ τmax, ∀n (19e)
Ps[n]  0, ∀n, (19f)
Pa[n]  0, ∀n. (19g)
It can be observed that problem (19) is challenging to be
solved for two reasons. First, the operator [·]+ results in a
nonsmooth manner. Second, even without [·]+, the objective
function (19a) has integrals with the expectation operator
E(·), which is intractable and difficult to achieve an explicit
expression in terms of 8s, 8a and 4.
Remark 2: It is worth mentioning that even though the
UAV’s propulsion energy is much higher than the UAV’s
transmission energy [7], we mainly consider the total trans-
mission energy constraint at each UAV in this work. The
reasons are as follows:
(1) Based on (12) - (18), secrecy throughput is highly
related to the UAV transmission power consumption.
Thus, to maximize the secrecy throughput, the UAV trans-
mission energy consumption is more important than the
UAV’s propulsion energy consumption.
(2) We investigate the power allocation strategy to enhance
the physical layer security of the downlink transmission
in this work, which is part of the process of the signal
processing. Based on problem (19), the power mainly
denotes the transmission powers of the confidential mes-
sages and AN transmitted by the UAVs. Since the propul-
sion energy is mostly used to keep the UAV aloft as well as
support its mobility, it nearly has little contribution to the
improvement of the secrecy performance of the system.
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(3) We perform the power allocation by considering an
optimization framework in a whole-trajectory-oriented
manner, where the UAVs follow a specific trajectory.
In this case, the UAV’s flying status, i.e., the flying period,
velocity, propulsion energy consumption and so on, can
be controlled with commands from the ground station
when they serve the legitimate users/eavesdropper, which
leads to the limited consideration of propulsion energy.
III. POWER ALLOCATION FOR SECURE AERIAL COMP
In this section, we devote our effort to achieve the optimal
solutions of problem (19). Before the further analysis, we first
handle the nonsmooth of the objective function in problem
(19) by adopting the similar analysis in [19]. Then, (19) can
be reformulated into
max
4,8s,8a
1
TU
N∑
n=1
τn
[
RB[n]− RE [n]
]
(20a)
s.t. 0 ≤ psl [n]+ pal [n] ≤ Pmax, ∀l, n (20b)
N∑
n=1
(psl [n]+ pal [n])τn ≤ Emax, ∀l (20c)
N∑
n=1
τn ≤ Tt , (20d)
0 ≤ τn ≤ τmax, ∀n (20e)
Ps[n]  0, ∀n, (20f)
Pa[n]  0, ∀n, (20g)
where problem (20) and problem (19) share the same optimal
solution, and R
(
4,8s,8a
) =∑Nn=1 τnTU [RB[n]− RE [n]].
To achieve the efficient power allocation, an explicit
expression of the objective function in (20) is necessary.
Although some works have provided an insightful result to
obtain the analytical expression for the objective function,
it is generally too cumbersome to do the further power allo-
cation design since the analytical result involves a series of
integrals [42].
In the following, we first achieve the closed form of the
secrecy throughput in terms of 8s, 8a and 4 by removing
the expectation operator E(·) based on [43]. Then, we refor-
mulate the optimization problem. Finally, a computationally
efficient iterative algorithm is proposed for the problem and
its convergence is presented.
A. PROBLEM TRANSFORMATION
Let Pu[n] = Ps[n] + Pa[n],∀n, where Pu[n] =
diag
[
pu1[1], . . . , p
u
L[N ]
]
, and 8u = {Pu[n],∀n}. Then,
the secrecy throughput R
(
4,8s,8a
)
can be equivalently
rewritten as
R
(
4,8u,8a
)
= 1
TU
N∑
n=1
τn
[
ESB[n]
[
log2 det
(
INB+
HB[n]Pu[n](HB[n])H
δ2
)]
−ESB[n]
[
log2 det
(
INB +
HB[n]Pa[n](HB[n])H
δ2
)]
−ESE [n]
[
log2 det
(
INE +
HE [n]Pu[n](HE [n])H
δ2
)]
+ESE [n]
[
log2 det
(
INE +
HE [n]Pa[n](HE [n])H
δ2
)]]
.
(21)
It can be observed that (21) is still intractable due to the expec-
tation operator E(·). To cope with that, we try to approximate
(21) by introducing the following theorem.
Theorem 1: By introducing auxiliary variables tB,u =
{tB,u[n],∀n}, tE,a = {tE,a[n],∀n}, tB,a = {tB,a[n],∀n},
tE,u = {tE,u[n],∀n}, R
(
4,8u,8a
)
in (21) can be equiva-
lently expressed as
Ras
(
4,8u,8a
) = maxtB,a≥0,tE,u≥0, mintB,u≥0,tE,a≥0,
G(4,8u,8a, tB,u, tB,a, tE,u, tE,a), (22)
where G(4,8u,8a, tB,u, tB,a, tE,u, tE,a) is defined in (23) on
the top of the next page. Furthermore,G(4,8u,8a, tB,u, tB,a,
tE,u, tE,a) is convex in terms of (tB,u, tE,a), and concave with
respect to (tB,a, tE,u).
Proof: Please refer to Appendix. 
Note that the performance gap between R
(
4,8u,8a
)
in (21) and Ras
(
4,8u,8a
)
in (22) is negligible, which
has been demonstrated in Fig. 3. Without loss of general-
ity, we randomly select a system topology, and adopt the
values of simulation settings in Section IV with different
transmission powers based on urban scenario. Specifically,
we first verify that K(4,8u,8a,wB,u,wB,a,wE,u,wE,a) =
y(4,8u,wB,u) − y(4,8a,wB,a) − y(4,8u,wE,u) +
y(4,8a,wE,a), which is based on the definition (44) in
Appendix, is the closed form of R
(
4,8u,8a
)
by simula-
tion in Fig. 3. Then, considering the relationship between
FIGURE 3. Illustration of the approximate accuracy of Ras
(
4,8u,8a
)
with the power of the confidential message at each UAV, where we set
NB = 5, NE = 3 and L = 7. We specify Pa[n] = paIL,∀n as the input AN
power. Particularly, pa from (a) - (d) in the figure are set 5dBm, 10dBm,
15dBm, 20dBm, respectively.
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G(4,8u,8a, tB,u, tB,a, tE,u, tE,a)
= 1
TU
N∑
n=1
τn
[
g
(
Pu[n],NB,QB[n], tB,u[n]
)
− g
(
Pa[n],NB,QB[n], tB,a[n]
)
− g
(
Pu[n],NE ,QE [n], tE,u[n]
)
+ g
(
Pa[n],NE ,QE [n], tE,a[n]
)]
= 1
TU
N∑
n=1
τn
{[
log2 det
(
IL + NBQB[n]Pu[n]QB[n]
δ2etB,u[n]
)
+ NB log2 e
(
tB,u[n]− 1+ e−tB,u[n]
)]
−
[
log2 det
(
IL + NBQB[n]Pa[n]QB[n]
δ2etB,a[n]
)
+ NB log2 e
(
tB,a[n]− 1+ e−tB,a[n]
)]
−
[
log2 det
(
IL + NEQE [n]Pu[n]QE [n]
δ2etE,u[n]
)
+ NE log2 e
(
tE,u[n]− 1+ e−tE,u[n]
)]
+
[
log2 det
(
IL + NEQE [n]Pa[n]QE [n]
δ2etE,a[n]
)
+ NE log2 e
(
tE,a[n]− 1+ e−tE,a[n]
)]}
. (23)
K(4,8u,8a,wB,u,wB,a,wE,u, wE,a) and G(4,8u,8a,
tB,u, tB,a, tE,u, tE,a) according to the derivation (52) in
Appendix, it is obvious to see that Ras
(
4,8u,8a
)
is a
very accurate approximation for R
(
4,8u,8a
)
. In this case,
the optimization problem (20) can be reformulated as
max
4,8u,8a,
tB,a, tE,u
min
tB,u, tE,a
G(4,8u,8a, tB,u, tB,a, tE,u, tE,a) (24a)
s.t. 0 ≤ pul [n] ≤ Pmax, ∀l, n (24b)
N∑
n=1
pul [n]τn ≤ Emax, ∀l (24c)
N∑
n=1
τn ≤ Tt , (24d)
0 ≤ τn ≤ τmax, ∀n (24e)
Pu[n]− Pa[n]  0, ∀n, (24f)
Pa[n]  0, ∀n, (24g)
tB,a ≥ 0, tE,u ≥ 0, (24h)
tB,u ≥ 0, tE,a ≥ 0. (24i)
It’s worth mentioning that by performing a serial of
reformulations, problem (24) is equivalent to the original
problem (19). In the following, we devote to an efficient
optimization algorithm for the equivalent problem (24).
B. AN ITERATIVE ALGORITHM TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM
Note that since (24) is not convex, it’s generally difficult
to achieve the global optimal solutions. In this subsection,
we propose an efficient iterative algorithm by adopting the
block coordinate descent method to find the stationary solu-
tions of (24).We first decouple the optimization variables into
the following four blocks (tB,u, tE,a), (tB,a, tE,u), (8u,8a),
4 and then alternately optimize these four blocks one by
one by taking the other variables as the constants obtained
in the last iteration. Specifically, for any given transmission
power indicators (8u, 8a) and the transmission duration
4, the auxiliary variables (tB,u, tE,a) (or (tB,a, tE,u)) can
be efficiently solved through standard algorithm [44]. For
any obtained auxiliary variables (tB,a, tE,u) and (tB,u, tE,a)
as well as the transmission duration 4, the transmission
power indicators (8u,8a) can be optimized by the successive
convex approximation technique. Finally, the transmission
duration4 can be achieved based on the obtained (tB,u, tE,a),
(tB,a, tE,u) and (8u,8a).
Denote m ≥ 1 as the number of the iteration step.
Problem (24) can be separated into the following four
subproblems.
(1) The auxiliary variables (tB,u, tE,a)
In the mth iteration, we first optimize (tB,u, tE,a) with
(8m−1u ,8m−1a ) and 4m−1 obtained in the m − 1th iteration.
In this case, problem (24) can be reformulated into
min
tB,u,tE,a
1
TU
N∑
n=1
τm−1n
[
g
(
Pm−1u [n],NB,QB[n], tB,u[n]
)
+ g
(
Pm−1a [n],NE ,QE [n], tE,a[n]
)]
(25a)
s.t. tB,u ≥ 0, tE,a ≥ 0. (25b)
Based on Theorem 1, we know that problem (25) is convex,
which can be efficiently solved by means of the standard
optimization toolbox, i.e., CVX.
(2) The auxiliary variables (tB,a, tE,u)
Based on the obtained (8m−1u ,8m−1a ) and4m−1 in them−
1th iteration, the variables (tB,a, tE,u) can be achieved by
min
tB,a,tE,u
1
TU
N∑
n=1
τm−1n
[
g
(
Pm−1a [n],NB,QB[n], tB,a[n]
)
+ g
(
Pm−1u [n],NE ,QE [n], tE,u[n]
)]
(26a)
s.t. tB,a ≥ 0, tE,u ≥ 0. (26b)
which is convex and can be directly solved using CVX.
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(3) The transmission power indicators (8u,8a)
The variables (8u,8a) with the obtained (tmB,u, t
m
E,a),
(tmB,a, t
m
E,u) and 4
m−1 in the mth iteration can be achieved by
solving the following problem
max
8u,8a
1
TU
N∑
n=1
τm−1n
[
g
(
Pu[n],NB,QB[n], tmB,u[n]
)
− g
(
Pa[n],NB,QB[n], tmB,a[n]
)
− g
(
Pu[n],NE ,QE [n], tmE,u[n]
)
+ g
(
Pa[n],NE ,QE [n], tmE,a[n]
)]
(27a)
s.t.
N∑
n=1
pul [n]τ
m−1
n ≤ Emax, ∀l (27b)
(24b), (24f), (24g). (27c)
Note that both g
(
Pu[n],NB,QB[n], tmB,u[n]
)
and g
(
Pu[n],
NE ,QE [n], tmE,u[n]
)
are concave with respect to Pu[n], and
both g
(
Pa[n],NB,QB[n], tmB,a[n]
)
and g
(
Pa[n],NE ,QE [n],
tmE,a[n]
)
are concave with respect to Pa[n] [43]. Thus,
the objective function in (27) actually mixes the addition
and subtraction of these four concave terms, which is neither
concave with respect to 8u nor concave with respect to 8a.
That is, problem (27) is not convex in terms of 8u and 8a.
To overcome the convexity issue, we approximate the sec-
ond and the third terms of the objective function in (27) to an
affine function based on the first-order Taylor expansion.
The gradient of g
(
Pa[n],NB,QB[n], tB,a[n]
)
5 can be
rewritten as
∇Pa[n] g
(
Pa[n],NB,QB[n], tB,a[n]
)
= ϕB,a[n]QB[n]
(
IL + ϕB,a[n]QB[n]Pa[n]QB[n]
)−1QB[n]
, F(Pa[n],NB,QB[n], tB,a[n]), (28)
where ϕB,a[n] = log2 eNB
δ2etB,a[n]
. Thus, the first-order Taylor expan-
sion of g
(
Pa[n],NB,QB[n], tB,a[n]
)
at a certain point P˜a[n]
can be expressed as
g
(
Pa[n],NB,QB[n], tB,a[n]
∣∣P˜a[n])
= g(P˜a[n],NB,QB[n], tB,a[n])
+ tr[F(P˜a[n],NB,QB[n], tB,a[n])(Pa[n]− P˜a[n])],
(29)
where g
(
P˜a[n],NB,QB[n], tB,a[n]
) = g(Pa[n],NB,
QB[n], tB,a[n]
)|Pa[n]=P˜a[n]. Clearly, g(Pa[n],NB,QB[n],
tB,a[n]|P˜a[n]
)
is a linear function with respect to Pa[n].
Similarly, the gradient of g
(
Pu[n],NE ,QE [n], tE,u[n]
)
can
be rewritten as
∇Pu[n] g
(
Pu[n],NE ,QE [n], tE,u[n]
)
= ϕE,u[n]QE [n]
(
IL + ϕE,u[n]QE [n]Pu[n]QE [n]
)−1QE [n]
, F(Pu[n],NE ,QE [n], tE,u[n]), (30)
5For convenience, we drop m.
where ϕE,u[n] = log2 eNE
δ2etE,u[n]
. Thus, the first-order Taylor expan-
sion of g
(
Pu[n],NE ,QE [n], tE,u[n]
)
at a certain point P˜u[n]
can be expressed as
g
(
Pu[n],NE ,QE [n], tE,u[n]
∣∣P˜u[n])
= g(P˜u[n],NE ,QE [n], tE,u[n])
+ tr[F(P˜u[n],NE ,QE [n], tE,u[n])(Pu[n]− P˜u[n])],
(31)
where g
(
P˜u[n],NE ,QE [n], tE,u[n]
) = g(Pu[n],NE ,
QE [n], tE,u[n]
)|Pu[n]=P˜u[n]. Clearly, g(Pu[n],NE ,QE [n],
tE,u[n]|P˜u[n]
)
is a linear function in terms of Pu[n].
In this case, problem (27) in the mth iteration can be recast
into
max
8u,8a
1
TU
N∑
n=1
τm−1n
[
g
(
Pu[n],NB,QB[n], tmB,u[n]
)
− g
(
Pa[n],NB,QB[n], tmB,a[n]
∣∣Pm−1a [n])
− g
(
Pu[n],NE ,QE [n], tmE,u[n]
∣∣Pm−1u [n])
+ g
(
Pa[n],NE ,QE [n], tmE,a[n]
)]
(32a)
s.t.
N∑
n=1
pul [n]τ
m−1
n ≤ Emax, ∀l (32b)
(24b), (24f), (24g). (32c)
Problem (32) is convex in terms of 8u and 8a. Therefore,
the optimal variables (8u,8a) can be solved by utilizing the
standard optimization toolbox CVX.
(4) The transmission duration 4
In the last step of the mth iteration, we focus on the trans-
mission duration 4 with the obtained (tmB,u, t
m
E,a), (t
m
B,a, t
m
E,u)
and (8mu ,8
m
a ), which can be achieved by the following opti-
mization problem
max
4
1
TU
N∑
n=1
τn
[
g
(
Pmu [n],NB,QB[n], t
m
B,u[n]
)
− g
(
Pma [n],NB,QB[n], t
m
B,a[n]
)
− g
(
Pmu [n],NE ,QE [n], t
m
E,u[n]
)
+ g
(
Pma [n],NE ,QE [n], t
m
E,a[n]
)]
(33a)
s.t.
N∑
n=1
pu,ml [n]τn ≤ Emax, ∀l (33b)
N∑
n=1
τn ≤ Tt , (33c)
0 ≤ τn ≤ τmax, ∀n (33d)
which is a convex optimization, and can be solved by adopt-
ing the general toolbox.
Based on the above analysis, an overall iterative algorithm
for problem (19) can be achieved. Specifically, in each itera-
tion, the original problem (19) can be optimized by alternately
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Algorithm 1 The Proposed Iterative Algorithm for Solving
Problem (19)
1: Initialize: the transmisson power 80u =[
P0u[1], . . . ,P
0
u[N ]
]
, the AN power 80a =[
P0a[1], . . . ,P
0
a[N ]
]
, the transmission duration
40 = [τ 01 , τ 02 , . . . , τ 0N ] and the accuracy  > 0.
Set m = 0.
2: repeat
3: Obtain the optimal set (tB,u, tE,a) by solving problem
(25) with the obtained sets (8m−1u , 8m−1a ) and 4m−1,
4: Obtain the optimal set (tB,a, tE,u) by solving problem
(26) with the obtained sets (8m−1u , 8m−1a ) and 4m−1,
5: Obtain the optimal set (8u, 8a) by solving problem
(27) with the obtained sets (tmB,u, t
m
E,a), (t
m
B,a, t
m
E,u) and
4m−1,
6: Obtain the optimal set4 by solving problem (33) with
the obtained sets (tmB,u, t
m
E,a), (t
m
B,a, t
m
E,u) and (8
m
u ,8
m
a ),
7: m− 1← m.
8: until The fractional increase of the objective function is
below the threshold  > 0.
solving problem (25), problem (26), problem (27) and prob-
lem (33) in an iterative manner. The details of the proposed
algorithm can be summarized in Algorithm 1.
C. CONVERGENCE PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
To analyze the convergence of the proposed algorithm,
we present the following Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: The approximation of the secrecy through-
put is monotonically increasing in each iteration, i.e.,
Ras
(
4m,8mu ,8
m
a
) ≥ Ras(4m−1,8m−1u ,8m−1a ), (35)
which demonstrates the convergence of the proposed
algorithm.
Proof: Based on the analysis in Section III-B, we could
achieve an approximation of G(4,8u,8a, tB,u, tB,a, tE,u,
tE,a) as shown in (34), as shown at the bottom of this page.
Recall that any concave function is upper bounded by its
first-order Taylor expansion at a given local point [45]. The
following upper-bounded expressions hold
g
(
Pa[n],NB,QB[n], tB,a[n]
)
≤ g(Pa[n],NB,QB[n], tB,a[n]∣∣P˜a[n]), (36)
and
g
(
Pu[n],NE ,QE [n], tE,u[n]
)
≤ g(Pu[n],NE ,QE [n], tE,u[n]∣∣P˜u[n]), (37)
where the equalities in (36) and (37) are met when Pa[n] =
P˜a[n] and Pu[n] = P˜u[n], respectively.
Thus, we could achieve
G(4,8u,8a, tB,u, tB,a, tE,u, tE,a)
≥ G¯[4,8u,8a, tB,u, tB,a, tE,u, tE,a∣∣(8˜u, 8˜a)], (38)
where the equality holds when 8u = 8˜u and 8a = 8˜a.
Based on the fact (38), we present the convergence of
Algorithm 1, as shown next. In the mth iteration, the optimal
solutions (8mu , 8
m
a ), (t
m
B,u, t
m
E,a), (t
m
B,a, t
m
E,u) and 4
m can be
obtained by Algorithm 1. Based on the properties of the sad-
dle point [44], the following relationship in the mth iteration
holds
G¯[4m,8mu ,8ma , tmB,u, tmB,a, tmE,u, tmE,a∣∣(8˜m−1u , 8˜m−1a )]
≥ G¯[4,8u,8a, tmB,u, tmB,a, tmE,u, tmE,a∣∣(8˜m−1u , 8˜m−1a )]. (39)
Let 8u = 8m−1u , 8a = 8m−1a and 4 = 4m−1. Then,
it follows from (39) that
G¯[4m,8mu ,8ma , tmB,u, tmB,a, tmE,u, tmE,a∣∣(8˜m−1u , 8˜m−1a )]
G¯[4,8u,8a, tB,u, tB,a, tE,u, tE,a∣∣(8˜u, 8˜a)]
= 1
TU
N∑
n=1
τn
[
g
(
Pu[n],NB,QB[n], tB,u[n]
)− g(Pa[n],NB,QB[n], tB,a[n]|P˜a[n])
− g(Pu[n],NE ,QE [n], tE,u[n]|P˜u[n])+ g(Pa[n],NE ,QE [n], tE,a[n])]
= 1
TU
N∑
n=1
τn
{[
log2 det
(
IL + NBQB[n]Pu[n]QB[n]
δ2etB,u[n]
)
+ NB log2 e
(
tB,u[n]− 1+ e−tB,u[n]
)]
−
[
log2 det
(
IL + NBQB[n]P˜a[n]QB[n]
δ2etB,a[n]
)
+ NB log2 e
(
tB,a[n]− 1+ e−tB,a[n]
)
+ log2 eNB
δ2etB,a[n]
tr
([
QB[n]
(
IL + NB
δ2etB,a[n]
QB[n]P˜a[n]QB[n]
)−1QB[n]](Pa[n]− P˜a[n]))]
−
[
log2 det
(
IL + NEQE [n]P˜u[n]QE [n]
δ2etE,u[n]
)
+ NE log2 e
(
tE,u[n]− 1+ e−tE,u[n]
)
+ log2 eNE
δ2etE,u[n]
tr
([
QE [n]
(
IL + NE
δ2etE,u[n]
QE [n]P˜u[n]QE [n]
)−1QE [n]](Pu[n]− P˜u[n]))]
+
[
log2 det
(
IL + NEQE [n]Pa[n]QE [n]
δ2etE,a[n]
)
+ NE log2 e
(
tE,a[n]− 1+ e−tE,a[n]
)]}
. (34)
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≥ G¯[4m−1,8m−1u ,8m−1a , tmB,u, tmB,a, tmE,u, tmE,a∣∣(8˜m−1u , 8˜m−1a )]
(a)= G(4m−1,8m−1u ,8m−1a , tmB,u, tmB,a, tmE,u, tmE,a), (40)
where (a) holds according to the analysis in (38).
According to (22), we know that6
Ras
(
4m,8mu ,8
m
a
)
= maxtB,a,tE,u mintB,u,tE,a G(4m,8mu ,8ma , tB,u, tB,a, tE,u, tE,a)
(b)= mintB,u,tE,aG(4m,8mu ,8ma , tB,u, tmB,a, tmE,u, tE,a)
(c)≥ mintB,u,tE,aG¯
[
4m,8mu,8
m
a , tB,u, t
m
B,a, t
m
E,u, tE,a
∣∣(8˜m−1u , 8˜m−1a )],
(41)
where step (b) holds since (tmB,a, t
m
E,u) are the optimal solutions
by using Algorithm 1, and step (c) holds due to the first-order
Taylor expansion as shown in (38).
Furthermore, we have
G¯[4m,8mu ,8ma , tmB,u, tmB,a, tmE,u, tmE,a∣∣(8˜m−1u , 8˜m−1a )]
= mintB,u,tE,aG¯
[
4m,8mu,8
m
a, tB,u, t
m
B,a, t
m
E,u, tE,a
∣∣(8˜m−1u , 8˜m−1a )].
(42)
Thus, according to (22), (40), (41) and (42), it follows that
Ras
(
4m,8mu ,8
m
a
)
≥ G¯[4m,8mu ,8ma , tmB,u, tmB,a, tmE,u, tmE,a∣∣(8˜m−1u , 8˜m−1a )]
≥ G(4m−1,8m−1u ,8m−1a , tmB,u, tmB,a, tmE,u, tmE,a)
(d)= maxtB,a,tE,u mintB,u,tE,aG(4m−1,8m−1u ,8m−1a , tB,u, tB,a, tE,u, tE,a)
(e)= Ras(4m−1,8m−1u ,8m−1a ), (43)
where step (d) holds since (tB,u, tE,a) and (tB,a, tE,u) are the
optimal solutions in Algorithm 1, and step (e) holds according
to the closed form of the secrecy throughput in (22).
(43) indicates that Ras
(
4,8u,8a
)
is nondecreasing
in each iteration, which can assure the convergence of
Algorithm 1. This completes the proof. 
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, the performance of our proposed scheme is
verified by simulation.We consider a 1000m× 1000m square
cell, and suppose there are N = 10 legitimate receivers
which are randomly distributed in the cell. The multiple
single-antenna rotary-wing UAVs, forming a UAV swarm,
hover above the scheduled legitimate receiver to provide the
confidential messages during a transmission duration. When
the UAVs hover to serve the scheduled one, they are ran-
domly dispatched in the circle of radius 50m with altitude
100m ∼ 200m, which is modeled as a cylinder in Fig. 4.
Then, the UAVs fly to the next scheduled one within a flying
duration. The eavesdropper randomly locates with a safety
distance re = 100m away from the scheduled legitimate
6Due to the limited space, we simplify the constraint tq,x ≥ 0 as tq,x ,
where q ∈ {B,E} and x ∈ {u, a}.
FIGURE 4. Illustration of positions of UAVs and the eavesdropper during a
transmission duration. The UAVs hover at arbitrary positions in the cylinder
above the scheduled legitimate user to serve it. The eavesdropper locates
in a circle with a safety distance 100m away from the legitimate user.
FIGURE 5. Secrecy throughput based on different transmission strategies.
user, which is modeled as a circle in Fig. 4, to hide himself,
and moves following the trajectory of the UAV swarm for
better eavesdropping. Unless otherwise specified, the system
parameters are set as follows: the number of antennas for
the legitimate users NB = 5, the number of antennas for
the eavesdropper NE = 3, the transmission duration budget
τmax = 8s, the total transmission duration Tt = 100s,
the consecutive period TU = 210s [46], f = 2.4GHz [4],
c = 3 × 108m/s, a = 5.0188, b = 0.3511 [37] and
the noise covariance δ2 = −107dBm [43]. The threshold
presented in Algorithm 1 is fixed as  = 10−3. We consider
the typical propagation environments using the following
(ηLoS, ηNLoS) pairs (0.1, 21), (1.0, 20), (1.6, 23), (2.3, 34)
corresponding to suburban, urban, dense urban, and highrise
urban, respectively [37].
To depict the performance of the proposed scheme,
we compare it with the existing scheme in Fig. 5 by con-
sidering the suburban environment. We assume P0u[n] =
p¯uIL ,∀n, where p¯u = 20dBm, P0a[n] = p¯aIL ,∀n, where
p¯a = 10dBm, 40 = [1, 1, . . . , 1], Emax = 150J. In the
existing scheme, confidential messages are transmitted for
the legitimate receivers byUAVs, andAN is transmitted in the
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FIGURE 6. Convergence of the proposed algorithm.
null space of the legitimate channel according to the instan-
taneous CSI HB via precoding. Similar to [39], the power
allocation between the desired signals and AN is considered,
where the ratio φ = NBNE+NB of the transmission power budget
is allocated to the desired signals, and the ratio 1 − φ is
allocated to AN. Note that, this scheme has been widely
investigated in the existing literatures but the large-scale
CSI has not been taken into account. From the simulation
results, we can observe that the proposed scheme presents
a significant performance gain over the existing scheme in
the case L = 7 and 9, which can be explained as follows.
In our proposed scheme, the UAV swarm could adaptively
transmit the confidential messages in a higher power when
it is close to the legitimate users based on the large-scale
CSI, and allocate the higher power for AN when the swarm
is close to the eavesdropper, which promotes the secrecy
performance improvement. However, due to the inflexible
signal transmission mode in the existing scheme, the confi-
dential messages and AN are transmitted in orthogonal chan-
nel spaces. Although the eavesdropper can bewell suppressed
by exploiting AN, it is not able to improve receiving quality
of the legitimate receivers with the fixed power of the desired
signals. Therefore, a poor secrecy performance is achieved.
To further illustrate the convergence of Algorithm 1,
we present the convergence process for 100 randomly-
generated system topologies by the proposed Algorithm 1 in
the suburban environment in Fig. 6. We initialize P0u[n] =
p¯uIL ,∀n, where p¯u = 30dBm, P0a[n] = p¯aIL ,∀n, where p¯a =
0dBm, 40 = [1, 1, . . . , 1], and set the transmission power
budget Pmax = 30dBm, the transmission energy budget
Emax = 300J, the number of the UAVs L = 7. It can be
observed that for the most cases, Algorithm 1 can converge
within 6 iterations and the ratio of iterations between 4 ∼ 5
could achieve 86%, which demonstrates the validity of the
proposed scheme.
Fig. 7 illustrates secrecy throughput by Algorithm 1 versus
the transmission power budget for each UAV in the suburban
scenario. We assume P0u[n] = p¯uIL ,∀n, where p¯u = 20dBm,
P0a[n] = p¯aIL ,∀n, where p¯a = 5dBm, 40 = [1, 1, . . . , 1],
FIGURE 7. Secrecy throughput versus transmission power budget for
each UAV.
FIGURE 8. Secrecy throughput versus total transmission energy budget
for each UAV.
Emax = 150J. From Fig. 7, we can see that secrecy through-
put increases when the transmission power budget for each
UAV becomes large. That is due to the fact that the increas-
ing transmission power can enhance the achievable ergodic
rate at the legitimate user or the eavesdropper. Furthermore,
in our proposed scheme, the confidential message and AN are
transmitted independently without cooperation at each UAV.
Based on the large-scale CSI, each UAV could allocate more
power to the confidential message to improve the achievable
rate of Bob when the UAV swarm is close to the legitimate
users. When the swarm is close to Eve, more power would be
allocated to AN for decreasing the signal receiving quality of
Eve. Also, for the same transmission power budget of each
UAV, secrecy throughput increases as the number of UAVs
in the swarm. Obviously, the larger the number of UAVs is,
the higher the power of the confidential messages is, which
significantly enhances the secrecy performance of the system.
Fig. 8 depicts secrecy throughput achieved by Algo-
rithm 1 versus the total transmission energy budget for each
UAV in the suburban scenario. It is assumed that P0u[n] =
p¯uIL ,∀n, where p¯u = 23dBm, P0a[n] = p¯aIL ,∀n, where
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FIGURE 9. Secrecy throughput versus total transmission energy budget
for each UAV in different typical environments.
p¯a = 10dBm,40 = [1, 1, . . . , 1], and Pmax = 35dBm. From
Fig. 8, it can be seen that secrecy throughput increases as the
total transmission energy constraint for each UAV becomes
large. That is because when the transmission energy budget
at each UAV increases, the transmission power at each UAV
is getting large over its flight. By using the large-scale CSI,
the power of the confidential messages and the AN power can
be intelligently designed. More power can be transmitted for
the confidential messages when the swarm is close to Bob,
and more power is allocated for AN when the swarm is near
to Eve. Thus, a positive secrecy throughput can be achieved.
Furthermore, we can also see that at the same transmission
energy budget of each UAV, secrecy throughput grows with
the increasing number of UAVs in the swarm. That is due
to the fact that as the number of UAVs increases, the total
transmission energy of the UAV swarm is getting high. In this
case, secrecy throughput could increase.
Fig. 9 presents secrecy throughput obtained by Algo-
rithm 1 versus the total transmission energy budget for each
UAV in different urban scenarios. We specify the initial
transmission power P0u[n] = p¯uIL ,∀n, where p¯u = 25dBm,
P0a[n] = p¯aIL ,∀n, where p¯a = 10dBm, Pmax = 35dBm and
40 = [1, 1, . . . , 1]. It can be observed that secrecy through-
put is various in the different propagation environments.
That comes from that the power loss is highly dependent
on the practical urban environments [37], which leads to
the divergence of secrecy throughput. Also, it can be seen
that as the total transmission energy budget for each UAV
becomes large, secrecy throughput increases. Furthermore,
secrecy throughput in the case L = 9 is larger than that in the
case L = 7. That is because that the total transmission energy
of the UAV swarm increases with the number of UAVs, which
leads to the higher secrecy throughput.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated power allocation of AN-assist
secure transmission for the UAV swarm-enabled aerial
CoMP, where the eavesdropper moved following the
trajectory of the swarm for better eavesdropping. We took
the composite channel including small-scale and large-scale
fading into account. Considering the hardness in acquiring
the perfect CSI, we maximized secrecy throughput by uti-
lizing only the large-scale CSI of the legitimate receivers
and the eavesdropper. Specifically, we designed the prob-
lem by jointly optimizing the transmission power of the
desired signals and the AN power under the constraints of
the total transmission energy of each rotary-wing UAV during
its flying period and the transmission durations for all the
legitimate users. The formulated problem was a non-convex
one. To handle that, we first achieved a closed form of the
secrecy throughput, and then provided an iterative algorithm
for the problem. Finally, we evaluated the effectiveness of our
proposed iterative algorithm by means of simulation results.
While an efficient power allocation scheme has been
developed to enhance the secure transmission for the
UAV swarm-enabled aerial CoMP, in future works we
plan to consider a pre-processing framework for the UAV
swarm-enabled aerial networks, where the user scheduling,
UAV trajectory and UAV altitude will be jointly considered,
in order to provide guidelines for the secure design of the
system. Furthermore, we will also develop a novel power
allocationmethod based on [47]–[50] by simultaneously con-
sidering the blockage caused by the abundant transmission
and the transmission energy constraint to improve the secrecy
performance of the system.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Considering the identical structure of four terms in (21),
we focus on the first term and denote it as fB,u(4,8u) =
1
TU
∑N
n=1 τnESB[n]
[
log2 det
(
INB + HB[n]Pu[n](HB[n])
H
δ2
)]
for
clarity. Referring to the remarkable studies in [43], [51],
the closed form of fB,u(4,8u) could be expressed as
fB,u(4,8u)
≈ 1
TU
N∑
n=1
τn
[
log2 det
(
IL + NBQB[n]Pu[n]QB[n]
δ2wB,u[n]
)
+ NB
[
log2(wB,u[n])− log2 e
(
1− 1
wB,u[n]
)]]
, y
(
4,8u,wB,u
)
, (44)
where wB,u = {wB,u[n] ≥ 1,∀n}, and wB,u[n],∀n can be
uniquely determined by the following fixed-point equation
wB,u[n]=1+
L∑
l=1
pul [n]Q
−1
B,l[n]
δ2 + NBpul [n]
(
QB,l[n]wB,u[n]
)−1 , ∀n.
(45)
Note that y
(
4,8u,wB,u
)
is a quite accurate form
of fB,u(4,8u) [43]. However, y
(
4,8u,wB,u
)
is still
intractable since wB,u[n],∀n involves the variable
pul [n],∀n. By introducing tB,u = {tB,u[n],∀n} and specifying
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wB,u[n] = etB,u[n],∀n, we have
y˜
(
4,8u, tB,u
)
= 1
TU
N∑
n=1
τn
[
log2 det
(
IL + NBQB[n]Pu[n]QB[n]
δ2etB,u[n]
)
+ NB log2 e
(
tB,u[n]− 1+ e−tB,u[n]
)]
, 1
TU
N∑
n=1
τng
(
Pu[n],NB,QB[n], tB,u[n]
)
, (46)
where tB,u ≥ 0 and etB,u[n],∀n needs to satisfy (45).
Based on (46), we first consider the partial derivation of
y˜
(
4,8u, tB,u
)
with respect to tB,u[n], which can be expressed
as
∂ y˜
(
4,8u, tB,u
)
∂tB,u[n]
= − τnNB
TU ln 2
[ L∑
l=1
pul [n]
(
QB,l[n]etB,u[n]
)−1
δ2 + NBpul [n]
(
QB,l[n]etB,u[n]
)−1
− 1+ e−tB,u[n]
]
, ∀n. (47)
Let s(tB,u[n]) = ∑Ll=1 pul [n](QB,l [n]etB,u[n])−1
δ2+NBpul [n]
(
QB,l [n]e
tB,u[n]
)−1 − 1 +
e−tB,u[n]. Thus, we have
∂ y˜
(
4,8u, tB,u
)
∂tB,u[n]
< 0, s(tB,u[n]) > 0,= 0, s(tB,u[n]) = 0,
> 0, s(tB,u[n]) < 0.
(48)
Denote s(tB,u) =
[
s(tB,u[1]), · · · , s(tB,u[N ])
]T . It can be
observed from (48) that y˜
(
4,8u, tB,u
)
is monotonically
decreasing when s(tB,u) > 0, y˜
(
4,8u, tB,u
)
is monotonically
increasing when s(tB,u) < 0, and y˜
(
4,8u, tB,u
)
achieves the
extreme minimum point when s(tB,u) = 0. That is, when tB,u
increases from 0 to infinity, the function y˜
(
4,8u, tB,u
)
would
first decrease and then increase.
In addition, it can be derived from (47) that
∂2y˜
(
4,8u, tB,u
)
∂t2B,u[n]
= τnNB
TU ln 2
[ L∑
l=1
δ2pul [n]Q
−1
B,l[n]e
tB,u[n](
δ2etB,u[n] + NBpul [n]Q−1B,l[n]
)2 + e−tB,u[n]]
> 0. (49)
Therefore, we can obtain that
∂2y˜
(
4,8u, tB,u
)
∂t2B,u
=
[
∂2y˜
(
4,8u, tB,u
)
∂t2B,u[1]
, · · · , ∂
2y˜
(
4,8u, tB,u
)
∂t2B,u[N ]
]T
≥0, (50)
which indicates that y˜
(
4,8u, tB,u
)
is convex in terms of tB,u.
With the above discussions from (47) to (50), we can
conclude that the function y˜
(
4,8u, tB,u
)
would achieve the
minimum value if and only if tB,u satisfies the following
equation
L∑
l=1
pul [n]
(
QB,l[n]etB,u[n]
)−1
δ2 + NBpul [n]
(
QB,l[n]etB,u[n]
)−1−1+e−tB,u[n]=0, ∀n.
(51)
Comparing (45) and (51), it can be observed that when tB,u
satisfys the fixed-point equation, the function y
(
4,8u,wB,u
)
would be minimized. Therefore, we have
y
(
4,8u,wB,u
) = min
tB,u≥0
y˜
(
4,8u, tB,u
)
. (52)
Finally, we generalize the aforementioned derivation to the
other three terms in (21), and then complete the proof.
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